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Racial Identity and the State:
The Dilemmas of Classification
Michael Omi*
Introduction
The February 1995 Chronicle of Higher Education featured
an article on racial classification and the sciences which high-
lighted an interesting dilemma facing scientists in the United
States.1 On one hand, scientists routinely use racial categories in
their research and regularly make comparisons between the races
with respect to health, behavior, and intelligence. 2 On the other
hand, many scientists feel that racial classifications are meaning-
less and unscientific. 3 For example, Professor Kenneth Kennedy of
Cornell University is quoted in the article as saying, "In the social
sense, race is a reality. In the scientific sense, it is not."4 It is the
reality of race "in the social sense" that I want to explore by fo-
cusing on the racial categories used by the federal government, the
problems associated with these categories, and their deeply politi-
cal character.
My initial interest in state-defined classifications of race was
inspired by a Louisiana case from the early 1980s. 5 In 1977, Susie
Guillory Phipps, who was then forty-three years old, found herself
in need of her birth certificate to process a passport application.6
Believing all her life that she was White, she was stunned when a
* Associate Professor, Department of Ethnic Studies, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. This paper was originally presented at the symposium Our Private
Obsession, Our Public Sin sponsored by the Institute on Race and Poverty, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School (October 13, 1995). The author thanks Carrie
Benson Fischer and Lori Schneider for their assistance with this Article.
1. David L. Wheeler, A Growing Number of Scientists Reject the Concept of
Race, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 17, 1995, at AS.
2. Id. at A8.
3. Id.
4. Id. at A15. Professor Kennedy's view is shared by many scientists who be-
lieve that there are no meaningful biological differences between members of dif-
ferent races. In a social context, however, racial differences are often dramatic.
5. Doe v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 479 So. 2d 369 (La.
Ct. App. 1985).
6. Calvin Trillin, American Chronicles: Black or White, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14,
1986, at 62 (recounting the details of Ms. Phipps' experience).
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clerk at the New Orleans Division of Vital Records showed her
that she was designated as "colored."7 As Mrs. Phipps told report-
ers, "It shocked me. I was sick for three days." The only person
apparently aware of Mrs. Phipps' racial designation on her birth
certificate was the mid-wife who wrote it down.9 "I was brought up
white, I married white twice."'10
Mrs. Phipps' racial classification was assigned under an old
Louisiana state law which allowed anyone with "any traceable
amount" of black ancestry to be legally defined as "black."" Ac-
cording to the state's genealogical investigation, Mrs. Phipps
great-great-great-great grandmother was a black slave named
Margarita. 2 Given this information, state stood by the designa-
tion of "colored" on Mrs. Phipps' birth certificate.' 3
The logic of Louisiana's racial classification is consistent with
what anthropologist Marvin Harris calls the principle of hypo-
descent.14  This rule provides that any 'White" person who is
known to have had a black ancestor is classified as black.15
Therein lies a particular kind of racial logic commonly deployed,
that anyone with a black ancestor, however distant, is also black.
Ms. Phipps sued the state of Louisiana to change her racial
designation from "colored" to "White."'16 She lost.' 7 In 1986, the
7. Id. at 62.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 63.
10. Id.
11. Id. In 1970, the classification was changed to require a person with more
than 1/32 black blood to be legally defined as "black." Id. The 1970 statute read, in
relevant part:
In signifying race, a person having one thirty-second or less of Negro
blood shall not be deemed, described, or designated by any public offi-
cial in the state of Louisiana as 'colored,' a 'mulatto,' a 'black,' a
'Negro,' a 'griffe,' an 'Afro-American,' a 'quadroon,' a 'mestizo,' a
'colored person,' or a 'person of color.'
Doe v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. 42:267). This statute was repealed in 1983. Trillin,
supra note 6, at 63.
12. Id. at 71.
13. After complicated calculations, the state investigator was ready to prove
Ms. Phipps was actually 5/32 black. Id. at 76.
14. MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 56 (1964).
15. Id. Brian B6gu6, Ms. Phipps' attorney also classifies this type of thinking
as an issue of denial of equal protection. "If you're a little bit black, you're black.
If you're a little bit white, you're still black." Trillin, supra note 6, at 78.
16. Doe v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 479 So. 2d 369 (La.
Ct. App. 1985).
17. Id. at 371. The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion which held that the defendant state officers had no legal duty to alter the
birth certificates unless the appellant could show that white was the correct racial
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Louisiana Supreme Court denied her motion to appeal.'8 Later
that same year, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the case
and thus left standing the lower court's decision. 19
The Phipps case dramatically illustrates the disjuncture be-
tween state-imposed definitions of race and how individuals per-
ceive their own racial identity. A thorough analysis of state defini-
tions of race reveals their deeply problematic construction and
highlights the difficulty-if not impossibility--of defining and
utilizing coherent and consistent categories over time. The discus-
sion which follows examines some of the problems.
I. State Definitions of Race
A. How the State Classifies Race
The designation of racial categories and the determination of
racial identity is no simple task. Over the last several centuries, it
has provoked numerous debates in this country, including intense
disputes over natural and legal rights, who could become a natu-
ralized citizen and who could marry whom.20
Racial and ethnic categories in the U.S. historically have
been shaped by the political and social agendas of particular times.
The first U.S. census in 1790 distinguished holders of the fran-
chise, namely White males, from the general population.2 1 The
designation. Id. at 372. The court stated, "[t]he voluminous record before us con-
tains fascinating evidence of race as a matter of physical appearance, heredity,
self-perception, community recognition, and cultural bias .... The intriguing ...
issues raised by this evidence belie simple legal questions-the only questions
courts of law are authorized, or indeed able, to answer." Id. The court acknowl-
edged that the repealed statute which provided the original basis for the racial
classification "was based upon wholly irrational and scientifically insupportable
foundations." Id. at 372. Nonetheless, the court also recognized that the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court had found the statute constitutional. Id. at 373 (Armstrong,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd.
of Health, 296 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974)). The court concluded, "[w]hile our present
opinion should not be interpreted to imply that we are bound today by social and
cultural precedent, we are nonetheless bound by legal precedent." Id. at 372.
18. Doe v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 485 So. 2d 60 (La.
1986).
19. Doe v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986)
(dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question).
20. It was not until 1967 that all state anti-miscegenation laws were ruled un-
constitutional. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. COMMISSION OF BEHAVIOR AND SOC. SCIENCES AND EDUC., COMMITTEE ON
NAT'L STATISTICS, SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY: THE FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR
RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION 5 (Barry Edmonston et al. eds., 1996)
[hereinafter SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY]. This first census was largely con-
cerned with political apportionment and taxation. In addition to noting slaves,
American Indians were counted separately for taxation purposes. Id. The census
1997]
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practice of slavery motivated changes in categorization such as
grouping blacks into free and slave populations. 22
The current categories of racial classification were assigned
and implemented by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in response to the anti-discriminatory and equal opportu-
nity laws of the 1960s and 1970s.23 Statistical Directive No. 15
(Directive 15), issued in 1977 by the OMB, fosters the creation of
"compatible, nonduplicated, exchangeable racial and ethnic data
by Federal agencies." 24 Directive 15 defined the basic racial and
ethnic categories to be utilized by the federal government for three
reporting purposes: statistical, administrative and civil rights
compliance. 25
distinguished U.S. inhabitants by five classes: "[1] Free white Males of sixteen
years and upwards, including heads of families; [21 Free white Males under sixteen
years; [3] Free white Females including heads of families; [4] All other free per-
sons; [5] Slaves." CENSUS OF 1790, reprinted in FIRST CENSUS OF THE U.S., 1790,
No. 1 (1990).
22. See SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY, supra note 21, at 5. The editors con-
cluded that racial and ethnic categorizations "have always been closely associated
with the politics and the social agendas of the times .... Id.
23. As federal and state governments enact anti-discrimination and equal op-
portunity laws, governmental determination of minority status and the collection
of racial and ethnic data becomes essential. Id. at 6. An example of these enact-
ments includes the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964), which pro-
vides that no person may, "on ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, or denied the benefits of ... any program receiving federal
financial assistance." Id. Additionally, the Equal Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1964), makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the
basis of "race, color.., or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
24. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STATISTICAL DIRECTIVE NO. 15 (May
12, 1977) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 15]. Directive 15, entitled "Race and Ethnic
Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting," provides:
1. Definitions
The basic racial and ethnic categories for Federal Statistics and pro-
gram administrative reporting are defined as follows:
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native. A person having origins
in any of the original peoples of North America, and who main-
tains cultural identification through tribal affiliation or commu-
nity recognition.
b. Asian or Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any of
the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian
subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands. This area includes, for ex-
ample, China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippine Islands, and
Samoa.
c. Black. A person having origins in any of the black racial
groups of Africa.
d. Hispanic. A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central
or South American or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless
of race.
e. White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples
of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East.
25. Id.
[Vol. 15:7
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B. The Problems in Directive 15 Classifications
An investigation of Directive 15 classifications reveals signifi-
cant problems in their construction and meaning. While most of
the categories rely on a concept of "original peoples," only one of
the definitions is specifically racial, only one is cultural and only
one relies on a notion of affiliation or community recognition.
26
There are few comparable criteria deployed across the categories.
For example, Directive 15 defines a black person as one having her
or his "origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa," but it
does not define a White person with reference to the White racial
groups of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East.27 Indeed
"Black" is the only category which is defined with an explicit racial
designator 2&--one which is quite problematic. What, we might
ask, are the "black racial groups of Africa"?
Hispanics are not considered and classified as a race but as
an ethnic group.29 The Hispanic category is, in fact, the only eth-
nicity that the state is interested in explicitly identifying and clas-
sifying. The category is defined through cultural designators-a
person of "Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South Ameri-
can or other Spanish culture or origin."3 0 In this definition, His-
panics can be of any race. 31
The category of "American Indian or Alaskan Native" reveals
another intriguing definitional issue. Individuals who are to be
counted in this category not only must have their origins in any of
the original peoples of North America, but must also maintain
"cultural identification" through "tribal affiliation or community
recognition."32 Directive 15 does not impose the requirement of
cultural identification on any of the other groups. 33
In addition to these facially apparent problems associated
with these definitions, there are cracks in this system of classifica-
tion in that particular groups cannot be situated within its frame-






31. Existing data collection efforts tend to assume that persons of Hispanic
ethnicity are either black or white, rendering affiliations with other racial catego-
ries nonexistent. See, e.g., SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY, supra note 21, at 28.




America do not fall within any category, and Brazilians, although
South American, are not of Spanish culture or origin.3
4
C. Challenging Federal Definitions
These problems and concerns have led to a serious question-
ing of the existing federal standards for racial and ethnic classifi-
cation. The obvious inconsistencies and omissions in the current
classifications warrant analysis and may need corrections. In Feb-
ruary 1994, I participated in a two-day workshop convened by the
National Research Council at the request of the OMB. 35 The pur-
pose of the meeting was to assess the existing racial and ethnic
categories as defined in Directive 15, to isolate problems in its use
as a research and administrative tool and to consider options for a
revision of Directive 15.
During the sessions, we heard directly from and about differ-
ent groups who were advancing political claims for recognition and
change in the existing standards. Some argued for a Hispanic
category which would combine race and ethnicity and be mutually
exclusive of the other four race categories. 36 Groups of native Ha-
waiians expressed the desire to move from the category of "Asian
and Pacific Islander" to "American Indian or Alaskan Native." 37
They argued that because of history and current sovereignty
claims they have much more in common with other indigenous
peoples than, for example, East Asians.38 Some Arab American
groups are currently lobbying for a Middle Eastern category. 39
34. SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY supra note 21, at 25.
35. The workshop is summarized in SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY, supra note
21.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 31. This suggestion was met with resistance at the workshop from
some groups representing American Indians. While native Hawaiians may have
more cultural or social experiences in common with American Indians as native
people in land taken by Americans, these groups argued that the legal relationship
between the U.S. and American Indians differs significantly from that of the U.S.
and Hawaiians. Id. The rationale for including native Hawaiians with American
Indians could also be extended to members of groups currently classified under
"Asian and Pacific Islander." The inclusion of native Hawaiians and possibly other
Pacific Islanders in a new "Indigenous People" category is an example of a possible
new panethnic formation and demonstrates some of the conflicts related to the
concept. See discussion infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 31.
39. Id. at 33. A 'Middle East" or "Arab American" panethnic identity currently
is being encouraged by some groups to aid in the fight against discrimination and
to fill other special needs of Arab Americans, totaling over one million at the time
of the 1990 Census. Id. The issuance of new racial categories in the census, how-
ever, is done cautiously, taking size, social, economic and legal factors into consid-
eration. Id.
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Noting that they are now classified as White, they argue that the
data Arab Americans need in order to address issues such as dis-
crimination are not available due to the lack of a specific racial
designator. 40
Perhaps the most controversial proposal was to add a multi-
racial category to the next census.41 Much of the momentum for
this idea comes from school districts which have seen a dramatic
rise in children of "mixed race."42 Their visible presence has led to
questions regarding how to classify them for reporting and plan-
ning purposes.
Proposed changes to the existing standards, emanating from
various political claims, have left some demographers and statisti-
cians unsettled. They would prefer to remove the determination of
categories from the realm of politics, and transfer it to the arena of
academic research. Such a move, in their view, would allow more
precise and scientifically determined categories to be constructed
and utilized for administrative reporting and the collection of data.
Any attempt to frame such structured categories, however,
immediately confronts a range of contradictory choices and gaps in
our understanding about racial classification and identity. The
following discussion surveys some of these problems.
II. The Problems in Racial Classification
A. The Conflict Between State Definitions and
Individual /Group Identities
The first significant problem in racial classification is the gap
between administrative requirements and popular consciousness.
The government's interests in identifying and tracking individuals
by race and ethnicity compel limitations that fail to acknowledge
the nuances of racial identity in reality.
The federal, state and local agencies involved in compiling
and analyzing racial and ethnic data do so with the intent to track
socio-economic progress, assess health trends, and determine pat-
terns of discrimination, well-being and life chances. Because
tracking such data requires longitudinal analyses, agencies want
relatively static categories which can be objectively determined.
Ideal racial and ethnic categories for such purposes would be con-
ceptually valid, exclusive and exhaustive, measurable and reliable
40. Id.
41. Id. at 38.
42. Id. at 13.
1997]
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over time. The Census Bureau and most government agencies
currently uses three different questions and concepts to describe
and categorize individuals: race,43 ethnicity44 and ancestry.
45
Such categories contrast sharply with conceptions of race and
ethnicity which recognize their dynamic nature and their
"slippery" subjective indicators such as identity. Partially because
of these limitations, administrative definitions may not be mean-
ingful to the very individuals or groups they purport to represent.
This is evident in Clara Rodriguez's study of Latinos which reveals
a strong group rejection of the dominant mode of conceptualizing
racial categories in the United States.46 For example, the Census
Bureau reports that 40% of Hispanic respondents in 1980 and
1990 answered the race and ethnicity questions "wrong." That is
they failed to check both a race box and an ethnicity box. 47 In addi-
tion, it is estimated that over 97% of persons reporting in the
"other race" category were Hispanic.48
Part of the problem lies with individual and group differences
in conceptualizing race. With respect to new immigrant popula-
tions, for example, it is important to examine the shifts in racial
self-identity as immigrants move from a society organized around
specific concepts of race, to a new society with a different mode of
conceptualization.
43. The 1990 Census asked the respondent to fill in one circle indicating the
race that person considered himself or herself to be. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
OFFICIAL 1990 U.S. CENSUS FoRM (1990). There were sixteen racial categories as
options: White, Black or Negro, Indian (American), Eskimo, Aleut, one of the iden-
tified Asian or Pacific Islander groups (Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, Viet-
namese, Japanese, Asian Indian, Samoan, or Guamanian), other Asian or Pacific
Islander, or other race. Id. at 2. American Indians were also asked to note their
enrolled or principal tribe. Id.
44. The ethnicity question asked whether the person was of Spanish/Hispanic
origin. Id. If so, the respondent was asked to note one of three categories: Mexi-
can, Mexican-American, Chicano; Puerto Rican, Cuban; or other Spanish/Hispanic.
Id.
45. The ancestry question was open-ended with no precoded categories, but
listed examples such as German, Italian and Afro-American. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION F-7 (1993). In 1980, the question asked,
"What is this person's ancestry." and in 1990 asked, "What is this person's ances-
try or ethnic origin? ' SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY, supra note 21, at 22. The
ancestry question is given only on "long form" questions, which are administered
to one-sixth of the population. Id. at 21.
46. Clara E. Rodriguez, Race, Culture, and Latino "Otherness" in the 1980 Cen-
sus, 73 Soc. ScI. Q. 930, 930 (1992).
47. SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY, supra note 21, at 21. Approximately 9.8
million people reported identified as "Other race." Id. See also Rodriguez, supra
note 46, at 932.
48. "In no state-including Hawaii--did more than 2 percent of the non-
Hispanic population indicate that they were of'other race."' Id.
[Vol. 15:7
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B. Changing Self-Identification
The second significant problem in racial classification is the
ever-changing character of racial identification, stemming both
from changes in state definitions and from shifts in how individu-
als or groups identify themselves. These constant changes frus-
trate the needs and intentions of the government institutions that
seek to clearly assign racial categories.
A fascinating example of changing self-identification is the
dramatic increase in the American Indian population. The num-
ber of American Indians increased from 552,000 in 1960 to
1,959,000 in 1990-a 255% increase in thirty years.49 This rate of
increase is virtually impossible demographically, but much of the
increase is explained by changes in racial self-identification.
These changes are driven by shifts in attitudes toward American
Indians, 50 a romanticization of the past and tangible benefits tied
to American Indian identification. 51
Researchers are likely to elicit different responses on racial
and ethnic identification in different historical periods. They are
also likely to elicit different responses from the same individual at
different points in her or his life cycle. Given the contextual na-
ture of racial and ethnic identification, it may be difficult or per-
haps impossible to achieve the necessary reliability and consis-
tency in time series data and analysis.
C. Life Cycle Effects
Another problem surfaces in that race is often identified by
third parties whose only basis for the racial assignment is the in-
dividual's outward appearance. Since 1989 births have been cate-
gorized by the race of the mother. 52 Racial classification at death,
49. Jeffrey S. Passel, Racial and Ethnic Differentiation in the United States:
Comments and Observations, Address at the Workshop on Race and Ethnicity
Classification, 17 (Feb. 17-18, 1994) (transcript on file with Law and Inequality: A
Journal of Theory and Practice). In addition to the rise in self-identified American
Indians, the number of Americans claiming American Indian ancestry increased
from 6.8 million in 1980 to 8.8 million in 1990. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Robert A. Hahn et al., Inconsistencies in Coding of Race and Ethnicity Be-
tween Birth and Death in US Infants, 267 JAMA 259, 260 (1992). A somewhat
complex system was used prior to 1989. In the previous system, newborns were
classified according to the race of the parents, if both were the same race; by the
race of the non-white parent, if one parent was white and the other was not; and if
both parents were non-white, the baby was classified according to the race of the
father (except if one parent was Hawaiian, in which case, the baby was classified
as Hawaiian). SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY, supra note 21, at 26 n.6 (citing
1997]
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by contrast, is designated by a third party, either a physician or
funeral director. 53 This has led to a peculiar situation where a
person may be born one race, and die another. In fact, studies
have suggested that there is an over-assignment of deaths to the
white category, a small under-assignment of deaths to the black
category and significant underassignment of deaths to American
Indian and Asian categories.m
This systematic discrepancy has led to significant errors in
statistical analysis and record keeping. For example, Robert
Hahn, an epidemiologist at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, found that established infant-mortality rates for some
groups are fraught with error.55 Linking birth and death certifi-
cates, he found that the infant-mortality rates were 46.9% higher
than previously reported for American Indians, 48.8% higher for
Japanese Americans and 78.7% higher for Filipinos.5 6 From birth
to death, current systems of racial classification are arbitrary and
inconsistent.
In addition to the apparent problems with existing classifica-
tions above,5 7 there is also the temporal effect of evolving racial
and ethnic labels. New labels come into vogue, old groups dissolve
through assimilation and new groups emerge as a result of
changes in civil status or patterns of immigration. Two particular
historical trends have emerged as significant causes of changed ra-
cial designations: panethnicity and multiracial consciousness.
D. Panethnicity
The reorganization of old groups and the creation of new
groups are features of changing political and social contexts.5 8 The
rise of panethnic consciousness and organization is a dramatic po-
litical development in the post-Civil Rights era.59 Groups whose
NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 21 (1995).
53. Hahn, supra note 52, at 260. Racial classification at death typically is as-
signed by the person or official who fills out the death certificate. Often this classi-
fication is based on the statements of the next of kin.
54. Id. at 261. Whites were over-assigned at death by 2.5%, while blacks were
under-assigned by 1.9% and Filipinos were underassigned 44.5%.
55. Id. at 262.
56. Id. at 261.
57. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying text (discussing OMB's Directive
15 which set guidelines for racial classifications by the federal government).
58. See generally David Lopez & Yen Le Espiritu, Panethnicity in the United
States: A Theoretical Framework, 13 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 198 (1990)
(discussing the historical process of panethnic association).
59. Id. at 198 ("[P]anethnicity... is an essential part of ethnic change.").
[Vol. 15:7
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previous national or ethnic identities were quite distinct became
consolidated into a single racial (or in the case of Latinos, ethnic)
category.
Prior to the late 1960s, for example, there were no people who
identified as "Asian American."60 In the wake of the civil rights
movement, distinct Asian ethnic groups, primarily Chinese, Japa-
nese, Filipino and Korean Americans, began to frame and assert
their "common identity" as Asian Americans.6 1 This political label
reflected the similarity of treatment that these groups historically
encountered at the hands of state institutions and the dominant
culture at large.62 Different Asian ethnic groups had been subject
to exclusionary immigration laws,63 restrictive naturalization
laws,64 labor market segregation 65 and patterns of "ghettoization"
by a polity and culture which treated all Asians as alike.
The panethnic organization of Asian Americans involved the
muting of profound cultural and linguistic differences and signifi-
cant historical antagonisms, which existed among the distinct na-
tionalities and ethnic groups of Asian origin. In spite of diversity
and difference, Asian American activists found the political label a
crucial rallying point for raising political consciousness about the
problems in Asian ethnic communities and in asserting demands
on political institutions.
Panethnic formations such as this are not stable. Conflicts
often occur over the precise definition and boundaries of various
panethnic groups as well as their adequate representation in cen-
sus counts, reapportionment debates and minority aid programs.
Panethnic consciousness and organization are, to a large extent,
situationally and strategically determined. There are times when
it is advantageous to be in a panethnic bloc, and times when it is
seen as more desirable to mobilize along particular ethnic lines.
Lumping various groups together may result in a flattening
of important distinctions we, as researchers and policy makers,
may wish to discern and analyze. Some groups may "all look
alike," but they are not homogeneous. How meaningful, for exam-
ple, is an Asian American category for analysis when both Japa-
60. See YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNIcITY: BRIDGING IN-
STITUTIONS AND IDENTITIES 19-20 (1992) ('[I]mmigrants from Asian countries did
not think of themselves as Asians.").
61. Id.
62. See id. at 14.
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. at 10.
1997]
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nese and Laotian Americans are subsumed under it? Such catego-
rization ignores significant differences between these two groups
of people.66 The conflation of important "differences" is a hazard
with the construction and use of particular categories.
E. Multiracial Identification
An important emerging issue is the inability of existing state
definitions to encompass people of "mixed racial descent." While
the number of such individuals is unclear and contingent on self-
definition, the 1990 Census counted two million children under the
age of eighteen whose parents were of different races.
67
In response to these demographic changes, there has been a
concerted effort from school boards and organizations such as
Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) to add a
"multiracial" category to the Census.68 This proposal has been op-
posed by many civil rights organizations. 69 Some groups fear a re-
duction in their numbers 70 and worry that such a multiracial cate-
gory would spur debates regarding the protected status of groups
and individuals. 71 According to the Census Bureau, 75% percent of
those who currently identify themselves as black could identify
themselves as multiracial.72 Though it is impossible to know
whether these qualifying people would so identify, complex issues
66. Among Japanese Americans, only 28.4% are foreign born, the median fam-
ily income is 137% of the national average, the poverty rate is 4.2%, and 55.9%
speak English at home exclusively. At the same time, among Laotians, 93.7% are
foreign-born, the median family income is 26% of the national average, the poverty
rate is 67.2% and 3.4% speak English at home exclusively. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE, THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER
AMERICANS 11-16 (1988).
67. Michael Marriott, Multiracial Americans Ready to Clain Their Own Iden-
tity, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at Y1.
68. Linda Mathews, More Than Identity Rides on a New Racial Category, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 1996, at Y1.
69. See, e.g., Raul Yzaguirre, Multiracial Census Category Would Undercount
Hispanics, (July 10, 1996), press release distributed by the Progressive Media
Project, Madison, Wisconsin, (on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory
& Practice) Yzaguirre argues that a multiracial category would lead to inaccurate
data collection and undermine the data's purpose of profiling the economic and so-
cial status of groups of people who have something in common.
70. Mathews, supra note 68, at Y1.
71. "Clear and consistent federal data collection on race and ethnic groups has
gone a long way in ensuring civil rights, due-process protections and equal alloca-
tion of federal resources to minority groups and economically disadvantaged com-
munities." Yzaguirre, supra note 69; see also Mathews, supra note 68, at Y1.
72. Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46,
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of identity would emerge from the institutionalization of a multi-
racial category.73
The debate over a multiracial category reveals an intriguing
aspect about how we conceptualize race. The very terms "mixed
race" or "multiracial" imply the existence of "pure" and distinct
races. Drawing attention to the socially constructed nature of this
category and the meanings attached to it reveals the inherent flu-
idity of our concepts of race.
F. The Shifting Meaning of Racial/Ethnic Identification
for White Americans
The meaning of racial/ethnic identification for specific groups
and individuals varies enormously. Recent research on White
Americans suggest that they do not experience their ethnicity as a
definitive aspect of their social identity. 74 Rather, they perceive it
dimly and irregularly, picking and choosing among its varied
strands that allows them to exercise-as sociologist Mary Waters
suggests in her study-an "ethnic option."75 Waters found that
ethnicity was flexible, symbolic and voluntary for her White re-
spondents in ways that they were not for non-Whites.
76
Jeffrey Passel's analysis of the open-ended question on ances-
try or descent which first appeared in the 1980 Census under-
scores the fluid nature of white ethnic identification. 77 The ques-
tion, 'What is this person's ancestry?" was followed by an open-
ended, write-in box. Below the box a group of more than a dozen
options were listed. What is intriguing is that the examples pro-
vided below the question had a dramatic influence on responses.
For example, in 1980 English was listed as an option but was
dropped in 1990.78 As a result the English population of the
United States declined by 34%.79 French was listed in 1980 and
when dropped in 1990, the French population fell by 20%.80 By
contrast, the Cajun population grew by more than 6,000% between
73. For a detailed discussion of this debate, see Wright, supra note 72.
74. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
75. See generally, MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN
AMERICA (1990) (analyzing socioeconomic differences based on ethnicity as re-
ported in the 1980 census).
76. Id. at 147-50.
77. See Passel, supra note 49, at 21.





1980 and 1990 as a result of the group's addition to the 1990 set of
examples.81
The loose affiliation with specific European ethnicities does
not necessarily suggest the demise of any clear group conscious-
ness and identity. The twilight of European ethnicity may in fact
signal the growth of a White racial identity. In an increasingly di-
verse workplace and society Whites are increasingly wondering
what it means to be 'White." What was previously a transparent
and "natural" category has now been rendered problematic as
Whites experience a profound racialization.
The racialization process for Whites is very evident on many
university campuses as White students encounter a heightened
awareness of race which calls their own identity into question. In-
terviews with White students at the University of California-
Berkeley produced responses such as these: 82
Many whites don't feel like they have an ethnic identity at all
and I pretty much feel that way too. It's not something that
bothers me tremendously but I think that maybe I could be
missing something that other people have, that I am not expe-
riencing.83
Being white means that you're less likely to get financial
aid .... It means that there are all sorts of tutoring groups
and special programs that you can't get into, because you're
not a minority.8 4
If you want to go with the stereotypes, Asians are the smart
people, the Blacks are great athletes, what is white? We're
just here. We're the oppressors of the nation.85
Here we see many of the themes and dilemmas of White iden-
tity in the current period: the absence of a clear culture and iden-
tity, the perceived disadvantages of being White with respect to
the distribution of resources and the stigma of being perceived as
the oppressors of the nation. Such comments underscore the new
problematic meanings attached to the category of White. The de-
bates about Whiteness will deepen in the years to come.
81. Id.
82. INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. CHANGE, THE DIVERSITY PROJECT: THE
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III. Assigning Race: The Debate's Meaning for Social
Research and Social Policy
In the midst of all of this uncertainty, however, there is one
indisputable conclusion: state definitions of race have inordinately
shaped the discourse of race in the United States. Originally con-
ceived solely for the use of federal agencies, Directive 15 has be-
come the de facto standard for state and local agencies, the private
and nonprofit sectors, and the research community. Social scien-
tists use the Directive 15 categories because they are the data
codings that are available.
Among scholars there is a continuous temptation to think of
race as an essence, as something fixed, concrete and objective.
There is also an opposite temptation: to imagine race as a mere
illusion, a purely ideological construct which masks some other
more fundamental division, such as class.
Much of sociological research, though firmly committed to a
social as opposed to biological interpretation of race, nevertheless
slips into a kind of objectivism about racial identity and racial
meaning. There is a marked tendency to treat race as an inde-
pendent variable and to downplay its own variability and histori-
cally contingent character. Thus, sociologists can correlate race
and residential patterns, race and crime, as well as race and intel-
ligence (as The Bell Curve8 6 controversy 7 dramatically reminds
us), without problematizing the concept of race itself.
There is no discussion among scholars about the constantly
shifting parameters through which race is considered-how group
interests are conceived, status is ascribed, agency is attained and
roles performed. Although abstractly acknowledged to be a socio-
historical construct, race in practice is often treated as an objective
fact: one simply is one's race.
Sociologists have debated the validity of race and have ques-
tioned whether to eliminate the concept, scale it back in usage to
86. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: IN-
TELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). This book created a
storm of controversy by arguing that intelligence is largely a genetic trait, and that
significant differences in I.Q. scores exist between racial or ethnic groups and be-
tween social classes. The policy implications are that most forms of social inter-
vention to raise I. Q. scores are doomed to fail.
87. See generally THE BELL CURVE DEBATE: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS
(Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995); THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE,
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1995). Both
works examine the concept of intelligence in detail, repudiate the claim that it is
genetically inherited and stress the social context in which racial and class differ-
ences in intelligence and economic performance should be considered.
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specific and verifiable applications, or leave it alone. David Decker
argues that a proper sociological protocol requires that:
[T]he use of race be defined explicitly when it is used in re-
search so that it is clear whether the term is being used to re-
fer to a mythical but perceived relationship between superfi-
cial anatomical characteristics and specific social groups, or
pointing to patterns and processes of discrimination, or to the
history of the use and abuse of the term in human societies. It
should not be used in a haphazard manner to seek correlates
between race as a variable and other variables. It should not
be used when researchers have not explained how and why
the concept has been defined and is being used.88
As an example, Decker states that there is little basis for pre-
senting criminal arrest rates by race without explicitly explaining
the meaning of race.8 9 Is race being used to indicate the inequity
of arrest procedures? Or is it being used to show how processes of
racial discrimination and its socio-economic consequences have an
impact upon the likelihood of criminal involvement? Or is it sug-
gesting that some groups are by genes or culture more predisposed
to criminal activity?
A few central questions continue to haunt policy-oriented re-
search: What is it that we are trying achieve in defining racial and
ethnic categories? What do we want to know and why? The fed-
eral government is currently grappling with these questions.
Some political conservatives have seized upon the difficulty of
establishing coherent racial categories as an excuse to call for the
abolition of all racial classification and record keeping.90 Such a
move, they argue, would save federal dollars and minimize ra-
ciallethnic distinctiveness, consciousness and divisive politics. Yet
accurate racial classification and record keeping is essential to sys-
tematically track patterns of discrimination and to gather data
useful for evaluating policy with respect to racial inequality. 91
Other social scientists and statisticians want to retain a sys-
tem of classification, but are arguing for categories which are con-
ceptually valid, exclusive and exhaustive, measurable and reliable
over time. The discussion above, however, illustrates the problems
88. David L. Decker, The Use of Race in Social Research 13 (1994)
(unpublished paper presented at the 65th Annual Pacific Sociological Association
Meeting, San Diego, Cal., April 12-17, 1994) (on file with Law & Inequality: A
Journal of Theory & Practice).
89. Id. at 13-14.
90. See, e.g. Clint Bolick, Discriminating Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at
A15; Black? White? Asian? Why Not American? GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Jul. 10,
1994, at F2.
91. 'ets Keep Black Folks in the Dark"." Proposed Restrictions on Collecting
Census Information, 10 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 20, 20, (Winter 1995/1996).
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in defining and maintaining such an "objective" system of classifi-
cation.
Race and ethnicity will continue to defy our best efforts to es-
tablish coherent definitions over time. The real world is messy
with no clear answers. Nothing demonstrates this convolution bet-
ter than the social construction of racial and ethnic categories.
Conclusion
The strange and twisted history of the classification of Asian
Indians in the United States provides an instructive note in con-
clusion. During and after the peak years of immigration, Asian
Indians were referred to and classified as "Hindu" though the clear
majority of them were Sikh. In United States v. B.S. Thind,9 2 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Thind, as a native of India, was in-
deed "Caucasian," but he was not 'White" and therefore was ineli-
gible to become a naturalized citizen.9 3 "It may be true," the Court
declared, "that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have
a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the aver-
age man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and
profound differences between them today."9 4
Asian Indians' status was revised after World War II when
they were allowed to naturalize as a consequence of the favorable
postwar environment.95 The Asian Indians' classification story,
however, further demonstrates the problems associated with rigid
classification efforts. In the post-Civil Rights era, Asian Indian
leaders sought to change their classification in order to seek
"minority" group status.96 The 1980 Census added the category
"Asian Indian" to include immigrants from India and their descen-
dants.97 Currently, young Asian Indian activists prefer the term
"South Asian" in order foster panethnic identification with those
from Pakistan and Bangladesh among other countries.
The point of this discussion is that racial and ethnic catego-
ries are often the effects of political interpretation and struggle
and that those categories in turn have political effects. This un-
derstanding is crucial for the ongoing debates around the federal
standards for racial and ethnic classification.
92. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
93. Id. at 213.
94. Id. at 209.
95. Sucheta Mazumbar, Race and Racism: South Asians in the United States,
in FRONTIERS OF ASIAN AM. STUD. 25, 30 (1989).
96. Id. at 35.
97. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OFFIcIAL 1980 U.S. CENSUS FoRM (1980).
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